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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. What is legal tender and what is required under our 
"Legal Tender Statute" in order to terminate the running of 
interest? Does a conditional draft which contains a complete 
release of the within pending law suit; and, a complete 
satisfaction of the un-liquidated judgment terminate interest on 
a judgment that had never been entered? 
2. In a replevin action, may the District Judge ignore the 
Court approved Replevin Bond and ignore the approved Supersedeas 
Bond (Finance Company's Attorney recognized that said approved 
bonds were in the file) (Tr-735 ) ; enter a judgment; issue a 
garnishment; satisfy the judgment; all within three (3) days, in 
violation of Rule 2.9 and thereby deprive the (defendants-
appellants), of their Utah Supreme Court award; and their right 
to attack said judgments or to appeal said judgments? 
3. Was the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment made and entered on 
February 5, 1982 dating said judgment back to December 4, 1981 a 
void judgment? Did said retroactive judgment defeat defendants 
right of appeal in that Rule 2.9 was never complied with? 
4. Was the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment granting $2,500.00 
Attorney fees, without supporting evidence, void? 
5. Was the granting of an additional $1,000.00 attorney fees 
for appellate work claimed to have been done on an appeal 
allowable under Utah law? When said case was never appealed to 
the Supreme Court! 
6. Great Equity Insurance Company should pay all attorneys 
fees in that the Insurance company was the wrongdoer. 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court ordered a judgment to be entered 
in favor of the defendants-appellants Hector Martinez and IVknuel 
Rivera. See case No. 18072, filed May 24, 1983. (Tr-534) This 
judgment was not entered until June 23, 1986. Hector Martinez and 
Manuel Rivera, appellants and defendants, herein, maintain that 
under these circumstances Judge Conder erred in ignoring: 
(a) The Replevin bond and the Supersedeas bond in the file. 
See (Tr-IOOA); (Tr-103); (Tr-599-601) 
(b) Judge Conder, in an attempt to frustrate the defendants 
judgment and right to appeal, violated Rule 2.9. 
(c) In this case, said judgment and order was entered on 
June 23, 1986 (Tr-688-712 inclusive). Without notice, the Court 
then permitted the issuance of a garnishment on the same day, 
(June 23, 1986). 
(d) Then the Court, within three days, without any Notice 
whatsoever to Defendants, accepted an answer to the garnishment 
from the Insurance Company prepared by William J. Hansen, the 
Insurance Company's Counsel, and entered a garnishee judgment 
thereon on the 26th day of June 1986. The Court again, without 
notice to the defendants, made and entered a garnishee judgment; 
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and immediately satisfied said judgment. See (Tr-688 to 712) 
inclusive. This wrongful conduct resulted in the taking of the 
defendants money judgment, which was ordered entered by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and, handing it over to General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation summarily- while the file was concealed and 
supposedly lost. See (Tr-707). Violating Rule 2.9 in its 
entirety. 
(e) The Finance Company and the Insurance Company committed 
an abuse of process in that they knew that the defendants 
intended to appeal said cause a Notice of Intent to Appeal 
(Tr-706) having been mailed to all parties on the 26th day of 
June, 1986, and said file having therein a good and sufficient 
Replevin Bond (Tr-58;59) and a good and sufficient Supersedeas 
Bond (Tr-599-601); (Said sureties having been duly examined and 
accepted by the Court Tr-IOOA.) 
THE "NUNC PRO TUNC" JUDGMENT 
2. In regard to the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment, defendants 
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera's counsel was completely 
misled concerning a supposed hearing that was to be held December 
2, 1981; on this date the entire cause was on appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court; said cause having been appealed on October 19, 
1981; the file was devoid of any judgments until February 5, 1981 
(Tr-539). In addition to the deception, The Finance company had 
failed to present any evidence of attorneys fees to either the 
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Court or the jury. It was defendants position that the Finance 
Company had waived their attorneys fees; there was no judgment or 
order in the file; no notices of the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgments 
were ever served on the defendants after their signing.. When the 
defendants were alerted to the fact that a "Nunc Pro Tunc" 
judgment had been entered the defendants right to appeal or 
challenge said judgment had long expired. Jay V. Barney states in 
his brief (February, 1984) Page 5;: "Judge Conder, in the 
presence of Counsel, signed the judgment and order as December 4, 
1981, but indicated "Nunc Pro Tunc" and designated his date of 
signature as "2/5/82;" Mr Barney certainly knew that 
"back-dating" of the judgment was in complete violation of Rule 
2.9. No notice of this signing was given to the appellants or 
their attorney. 
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEYS FEES HEREIN 
3. Judge Conder erred in granting attorneys fees which are 
not supported by any evidence? The affidavit filed to support the 
attorneys fees stated only a bare conclusion that plaintiff's 
counsel is entitled to $2,500.00. Said affidavit being a mere 
conclusion; totally un-supported by any facts or any evidence; 
and should render the judgment void. 
4. Judge Conder erred in granting of additional attorneys 
fees of $1,000.00 upon a case which was not appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, and, the granting of attorneys fees that was not 
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for work done but was of a punitive nature? Said additional grant 
was not supported by any facts or evidence and should be declared 
void. 
5. Any and all attorneys fees should be paid by Great 
Equity Insurance Company. Great Equity breached their contract. 
Great Equity Insurance Company failed to make the payments after 
Hector Martinez became totally disabled; Great Equity was the 
wrong doer. 
THE TERMINATING OF THE RUNNING OF INTEREST 
5. Judge Conder erred in terminating the running of interest 
on a Supreme Court Order to enter judgment; said judgment having 
not been entered when the tender was supposedly made. In addition 
thereto, the draft was a conditional draft which contained a 
release, and which stated that by endorsement it supposedly 
satisfied a non-existent judgment; the draft further stated and 
released Great Equity Life Insurance of any and all claims that 
existed among the parties. Under these circumstances no tender 
was ever made; and, the draft was mailed to General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation, and their attorney, Jay V. Barney, and 
was never tendered to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera or Mark S. 
Miner, their attorney, in that said draft was never delivered to 
these defendants or their attorney; when Hector Martinez and 
Manuel Rivera were advised by letter that Jay V. Barney possessed 
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the draft said draft was summarily rejected by returning the 
draft for costs and rejecting all drafts not tendered.(Tr-652) 
6. The foregoing facts give rise to the issue - May the 
Court terminate interest by holding that there was a legal tender 
under Section 78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, when said judgment 
was was never entered; and, the written offer to pay or deliver 
contained therein a release, and a recitation stating that the 
draft satisfied all unliquidated judgment and released Great 
Equity Insurance company of all pending claims and suits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a replevin action (Tr-2). General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation sought to replevy and take an automobile purchased by 
Hector Martinez. Hector Martinez suffered complete kidney failure 
and was using the automobile to drive to the University Hospital 
for dialysis three times a week. In order to prevent the taking 
of the Chevrolet car by the Finance Company, Hector Martinez and 
his father, Manuel Rivera, filed a good and sufficient replevin 
bond with the court and the sureties were duly justified by the 
court (Tr-59). This bond is in the file and is in good standing 
and is in full force and effect and was duly accepted and 
approved by the Finance Company (Tr-103). 
The replevin action was tried by Judge Dean Conder, who 
entered judgment against the defendants (Tr-291). This judgment 
was appealed October 19, 1981 (Tr-326) and reversed by the Utah 
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Supreme Court May 24, 1983; see Case No. 18072. On February 5, 
1982, without notice to the defendants, Judge Dean Conder entered 
a "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment against Hector Martinez and Manuel 
Rivera in the amount of $4,717.00 and a further amount of 
$2,500.00 attorneys fees and court costs of $127.00 (See Tr-539) 
This judgment was entered in complete violation of Rule 2.9 of 
District Court Rules, in that no notice that the judgment had 
been signed was given to defendant-appellants herein; and since 
the defendants received no notice of this judgment until after 
their time to appeal had expired, no appeal was taken from this 
"Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment, and therefore this judgment should be 
found to be a void judgment. 
On August 15, 1983, the Finance Company's counsel moved the 
Court for an additional $1,000.00 attorneys fees for work alleged 
to have been performed on appeal in the case in chief of GMAC v. 
Hector Martinez. This portion of the case was never appealed; 
regardless of this fact, Judge Dean Conder granted the Finance 
Company's attorney an additional $1,000.00 attorneys fees for 
work done on appeal and the further reason "that defendants 
counsel failed to appear at the September 1, 1983 hearing" 
(Tr-579). On October 13, 1983, counsel for Hector Martinez and 
Manuel Rivera appealed the granting of the additional $1,000.00 
attorneys fees to the Utah Supreme Court, promptly, and this 
issue is now a proper issue in this case. The effect of the 
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District Court judgment allowing an additional $1,000.00 
attorneys fees was to increase the void "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment 
of $2,500.00 attorneys fees. See (Tr-539) awarded February 5, 
1982; to $3,500.00 for appellate work on a case that was never 
appealed! See (Tr-549). See also the combined notices that the 
hearing would be postponed to September 22, 1983 (Tr-551;556) and 
see also (Tr-559;560 ). 
FACTS CONCERNING THE TERMINATING OF INTEREST ARE AS FOLLOWS 
(Tr-670) 
On June 23, 1986, the District Court terminated the running 
of interest on the Utah Supreme Court judgment by reason of an 
alleged offer to settle and terminate the above-entitled cause by 
the Great Equity Insurance Company, allegedly made on November 7, 
1983 (Tr-690). The judgment recited that "the offer in writing on 
November 7, 1983," was a tender under the meaning of Section 
78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Tr-690). Such is not the 
case. On November 7, 1983, Great Equity Insurance Company's 
attorney mailed a draft to Jay V. Barney in the amount of 
$6,135.36 payable to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera, and their 
attorney Mark S. Miner; and GMAC and its attorney, Jay V. Barney. 
(This draft was never delivered to, handed to, or tendered to 
Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera or Mark S. Miner.) See (Tr-673) 
also (Tr-670;671. ) On this date, November 7, 1983, the Utah 
Supreme Court judgment was totally unliquidated. On this date, 
November 7, 1983, the Utah Supreme Court judgment which was then 
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and there in effect read: "The judgment of the trial Court is 
reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment against 
Great Equity and in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera." 
The issue of attorneys fees and costs was still pending. See 
(Tr-607). Please note, that the draft delivered to Jay V. Barney 
was conditioned upon Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera 
terminating their suit against Great Equity Insurance Company and 
delivering to Great Equity Insurance Company a complete 
satisfaction of a non-entered judgment (Tr-670). Regardless of 
this, Judge Dean Conder entered an order on June 23, 1986, that 
Great Equity Insurance Company "has no responsibility for 
interest to Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera from and after 
November 7, 1983." (Tr-580) The Supreme Court's judgment granting 
interest was summarily terminated under the claim that there was 
a "purported" tender. 
On November 7, 198 3, in fact, no tender was ever made. The 
facts are Great Equity Insurance Company mailed a draft to Jay V. 
Barney in the amount of $6,135.36 (Tr-670). This draft was 
conditioned upon all parties, including Hector Martinez, Manuel 
Rivera and JNferk S. Miner, their attorney, giving Great Equity 
Insurance Company a complete release of all claims and all causes 
of action against Great Equity Insurance Company. This draft was 
made out to General Motors Acceptance Corporation; Jay V. Barney, 
their attorney; Hector Martinez; Manuel Rivera and their 
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their attorney; Hector Martinez; Manuel Rivera and their 
attorney, Mark S. Miner. This check was never mailed to Mark S. 
Miner, in fact, it never left Jay V, Barney's office. At this 
time, November 7, 1983, no judgment had been entered against 
Great Equity Insurance Company by the District Court and there 
was no judgment to be satisfied. The draft provided, in addition 
to a complete release of any and all claims and causes of action, 
that all judgments against Great Equity Insurance Company would 
be duly satisfied. This tender was void in that there was no 
judgment entered to be satisfied. also on this date, there were 
numerous motions pending before the District Court. The only 
draft that was mailed to the defendants and their attorney was 
one for court costs (Tr-648); this draft for court costs was 
returned forthwith! Irregardless of the foregoing rejection of 
any offers or any tenders; Judge Dean Conder ruled on June 23, 
1986, that there was a tender made on November 7, 1983, and that 
Great Equity's accruing interest on the judgment, which was 
ordered entered by the Utah Supreme Court, was terminated as of 
November 7, 1983. An immediate appeal was taken from this order 
and judgment; and, this is one of the critical issues before the 
Court. 
1Q 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. An offer in writing to 
pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument 
or specific personal property, is, if not accepted, equivalent to 
the actual production and tender of the money, instrument or 
property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, his father, defendants, 
appeal from multiple orders and judgments which have been entered 
by Judge Dean Conder, while the above-entitled cause was pending 
in the Utah Supreme Court. See 668 P 2d 498 (1983); (Tr-536). 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation sued defendants for 
non-payment of automobile loan in a replevin action; defendant 
Hector Martinez having lost both kidneys, brought a third-party 
complaint against Great Equity Insurance Company to enforce 
disability insurance policy. Judge Conder entered judgment as a 
matter of law against the defendant in favor of General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation and against the totally disabled Hector 
Martinez. This September 23, 1981 judgment was appealed and 
reversed (Tr-607). On February 5, 1982 a "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment 
was signed and entered dating the judgment back to December 4, 
1981. No appeal was taken from this "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment in 
that it was entered "Nunc Pro Tunc"; without notice to the 
defendant or their counsel; retroactively dating the judgment 
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back to December 4, 1981. See (Tr-539). Thereby depriving 
defendants of their right to appeal; and enlarging the rights of 
GMAC , by making a judgment that could not be attacked or 
appealed. See Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2nd 382; 370 P 2d 28. 
In the case in chief, the Utah Supreme Court held that Great 
Equity Insurance Company was estopped from denying the disabled 
Hector Martinez coverage under the policy. The case was remanded 
"for entry of judgment and costs against Great Equity and in 
favor of defendants." (Tr-607;534) No judgment was entered until 
June 23, 1986; at which time Judge Dean Conder by an order, again 
retroactively terminated interest on the non-entered ordered 
judgment as of November 7, 1983; and he did by order and judgment 
re-enter the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgment of February 5, 1982; and he 
did add another $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) attorneys fees 
for appellate work making the total judgment $3,500.00. (Tr-690). 
See Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing, 16 Utah 2d 382; 
399 P 2d 141; See also Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P 2d 
974. 
Defendants appealed from February 5, 1981 "Nunc Pro Tunc" 
judgment and from the September 27, 1983 judgment on October 13, 
1983. On December 12, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court remanded said 
cause back to the Trial Court for entry of judgment as set forth 
in a prior decision. See (Tr-607). With the further instruction 
that all pending issues were to be ruled upon and after all 
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matters and issues were adjudicated and after an Order certifying 
that Rule 54 (b) had been complied with; defendant and appellants 
would be entitled to a further appeal on all final judgments. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING INTEREST ON SUPREME 
COURT JUDGMENT (TR-690). 
The November 7, 1983, transaction between William Hansen, 
attorney for Great Equity Insurance Company and Jay V. Barney, 
attorney for GMAC was not a tender under Section 78-27-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (Tr-690h 
There was no tender made on November 7, 1983, by Great 
Equity Insurance Company to the defendants, Hector Martinez and 
Manuel Rivera. On November 7, 1983, Great Equity Life Insurance 
Company mailed a draft in the amount of $6,135.36, to Jay V. 
Barney, the attorney for General Motors Acceptance Corporation; 
this conditional draft was never presented to Mark S. Miner or 
the defendants herein. This conditional draft was made out to 
GMAC, Jay V. Barney, Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and Mark S. 
Miner. This check was conditional upon receiving a Satisfaction 
of judgment from Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and Mark S. 
Miner. No judgment had been entered, and there was no judgment to 
be satisfied. The tender was void. The Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah ordered and directed that a judgment be rendered, made 
and entered, in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera and 
against Great Equity Life Insurance Company. The Supreme Court's 
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order was never carried out and no judgment was ever entered. 
There was pending before the Trial Court numerous motions 
concerning the judgment that attorneys fees. See December 12, 
1985 decision (Tr-607). 
A tender, to be good, must be free from any conditions which 
the tender does not have the right to insist upon. See Sieverts 
v. White, supra. The conditions which Great Equity Insurance did 
not have the right to insist upon were as follows: 
(1) The satisfaction of a judgment which had not been 
determined and which was unliquidated. 
(2) Great Equity Insurance demanded a satisfaction of 
judgment and a dismissal with prejudice of the defendants lawsuit 
which was then and there pending before the Court concerning 
Attorneys fees, interest and costs. See the Utah Supreme Court 
Decision which returned and remanded said cause to the District 
Court for the purpose of having a proper judgment entered; said 
judgment to include attorneys fees, interest and costs. 
(3) The Court will note that the draft was never tendered to 
or given to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera or their attorney, 
Mark S. Miner. The payees were Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera, 
Mark S. Miner, GMAC, and their attorney, Jay V. Barney. The draft 
required a full and complete release of all claims and dismissal 
of all actions against Great Equity and a satisfaction of 
judgment from Mark S. Miner. See (Tr-670). On November 28, 1984, 
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the draft was returned to William J. Hansen, he having been 
informed that the defendants would not accept the draft under the 
conditions described and insisted upon by the insurance company. 
The Court will note that at no time were there any tenders, 
offers, checks or drafts given to or offered to Hector Martinez, 
Manuel Rivera or their attorney, Mark S. Miner, with the 
exception of a draft for court costs which was returned by reason 
of it being connected to and made part of the voucher for 
$6,135.36. The court costs, in this case, have never been paid 
and remain outstanding. (Tr-648-651) The offer of Great Equity 
Insurance Company to terminate the lawsuit was promptly rejected 
by reason of the unreasonable conditions that were attached to 
the tender. 
(4) At the time the draft was mailed to Jay V. Barney, there 
was pending before the Trial Court numerous motions all of which 
were concerned with the proper entry of judgment; while these 
matters were pending, to wit: on October 13, 1983, Hector 
Martinez and Manuel Rivera appealed all pending issues to the 
Utah Supreme Court. Notice of Appeal, a Docketing Statement and 
a Designation of Record was properly served. All parties and 
their attorneys were aware of the fact that the conditional 
tender had been rejected. These defendants had always acted 
promptly and have never waived any rights pending the hearing of 
the matters referred to the District Court by the Supreme Court. 
15 
Section 78-27-1 is a statute which requires strict 
performance of a legal tender. See 52 Am. Jur. 215, 231, Tender, 
Sections 2 and 24; also See Sieverts v. White, supra., and cases 
cited therein. See also 62 CJ 670 Section 38; 36 CJS Tender, 
Section 27; Woods v. Dixon, 193 OR 628, 240 P 520; Radalj v. 
Union Savings and Loan, 59 WYO 140, 138 P 2d 984, 141 P 2d 856. 
The Great Equity Insurance Company had no right to pay the 
judgment which was granted Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera 
directly over to GMAC and their attorney, Jay V. Barney, when the 
Utah Supreme Court had ordered the entry of judgment against 
Great Equity Insurance Company and in favor of Hector Martinez 
and Manuel Rivera along with instructions for the lower Court to 
re-examine the issue of attorneys fees, interest and costs 
(Tr-609). The tender made by Great Equity Insurance Company was 
not made in good faith and was not made in a manner as to most 
likely, under the circumstances, benefit the defendant, Hector 
Martinez herein; in fact the tender only benefited the Finance 
Company and GMAC. Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera could not 
have accepted same without suffering irreparable damage. See K & 
M Inc. v. LeCuyer, Cal. App., 233 P 2d 569; 107 Cal. App. 2d 710, 
238 P 2d 28; 107 Cal. App. 2d 845, 238 P 2d 33. 
The District Court Judge took a personal offense to being 
reversed by the Utah Supreme Court (Tr-741). 
The Court: "I don't think they (Utah Supreme Court) ruled 
you (Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera) should have been paid, they 
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(Utah Supreme Court) simply ruled that your client should have 
been notified of a limitation. Wasn't that all they held?" 
Mr. Miner: "No sir. They said you were to enter judgment * * 
* * * in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera and against 
Great Equity." 
The Court: "What about that, Mr. Barney. How are you going 
to collect on a check if there has never been a judgment entered 
on it?" 
Mr. Barney: "Well that was my first Motion before the Court, 
your Honor." (Tr-742, April 8, 1986.) 
So what did the Court do? Judge Conder, on June 23, 1986, 
signed the order that plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment 
against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company in the amount of 
$4,717.50, with interest, until fully paid, together with costs 
of court and attorneys fees in the sum of $3,500.00, that Hector 
Martinez and Manuel Rivera are granted judgment against Great 
Equity Life Insurance Company in the sum of $4,717.50, with 
interest thereon up to November 7, 1983 and court costs of 
$742.85 and Ordered and Decreed that Great Equity Life may 
circumvent Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera; and, as a 
consequence of the June 23, 1986 proceedings, pay the money 
directly to General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The Court 
further entered a Satisfaction of Judgment in which the Court 
satisfied the judgment that Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera had 
against Great Equity Insurance Company (Tr-697;698). All of these 
acts were done in complete violation of Rule 2.9 and without 
notice and knowledge of Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, the 
defendants herein and by these "secret" summary proceedings; the 
defendants were deprived of their Supreme Court judgment, along 
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with ; t h e i r r i g h t to f i l e proper motions and t h e i r r i g h t to 
appeal t h i s ques t i onab le conduct . All of the foregoing a c t s were 
done in complete d i s r ega rd to the Replevin Bond and the 
S u p e r s e d e a s B o n d s w h i c h w e r e i n t h e f i l e . S e e 
(Tr -58 ;59 ;60 ;599-601 . ) Defendants pray t h a t these judgments be 
r eve r sed . 
THE AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR 
SERVICES RENDERED ON APPEAL, WHEN THE CASE WAS NEVER APPEALED, 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that no 
attorneys fees should be awarded unless they are supported by 
evidence of necessity and reasonableness. See Walker v. Sandwick, 
548 P 2d 1243 (Utah 1966); Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 
401, 402 P 2d 699; Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Company, 537 
P 2d 1039. The record is devoid of any supporting evidence to 
support attorneys fees. This portion of the judgment should be 
stricken and denied. It is clear that a fee must be supported by 
evidence in the record. See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 
485 P 2d 1044. The award of attorneys fees must be based upon 
evidence produced in the case in chief and not after. See Gardner 
v. Christiansen, 622 P 2d 782. The affidavits submitted by GMAC 
Finance Company were nothing more than mere conclusions. The 
transcript and record herein is devoid of any evidence concerning 
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1. The ability of the attorney. 
2. The difficulty of the problems involved. 
3. The rate charged per hour. 
4. The number of hours put in on the case. 
5. The amount of money sued for. In fact, there is no 
evidence to support a judgment for $3,500.00 attorneys fees. See 
Richard v. Hodson, supra, also Walker v. Sandwick, supra. Hector 
Martinez and Manuel Rivera and their counsel, Mark S. Miner, were 
never given the opportunity to attack the issue of attorneys fees 
during the trial nor at any time thereafter. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD PAY ATTORNEYS 
FEES 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company wrongfully refused to 
make payments as made and provided by the insurance policy even 
though the policy was current, as far as premiums are concerned 
and Hector Martinez made all payments under the contract until he 
was totally disabled. All notices, doctor's reports and necessary 
papers were properly filed. All insurance premiums were paid in 
full (Tr-20). The insurance company had thirty days to accept or 
reject Hector Martinez as an insured (Tr-25). The insurance 
company denied coverage under the policy eight (8) months after 
the loss occurred (Tr-163). The insurance policy was in full 
force and effect when the loss occurred; hence, Great Equity 
should pay for all defaults including attorneys fees, (see Seigel 
v. William E. Bookholtz, 419 Fed 2d 720, 723 (DC Circuit, 1969). 
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In this case, there was little or no investigation. The company 
did manifest steady determination to abide by its contrary 
decision; and, for nine (9) months they procrastinated with the 
delayed investigation which ultimately resulted in the insurance 
company leaving the ailing Hector Martinez helpless and nine (9) 
months in arrears in payments as a result of the insurer's 
withdrawal and denial of his claim. Great Equity Insurance 
Company failed to comply with the terms of the insurance 
contract. The insurance company failed to live up to the standard 
of conduct commensurate with the public nature of the insurance 
business. Great Equity not only breached their contract of 
insurance, and thereby wronged its insured, but it completely 
failed in its public duty. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Company, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P 2d 141, 146, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 
(1979). See also Dinkings v. American National Insurance Company, 
92 Cal. App. 3d 222, 154 Cal. Rptr. 775, which held that the 
insured is entitled to recover that portion of attorneys fees 
necessary and attributable to recover the amount due under the 
policy. Great Equity Insurance Company having breached the 
contract should pay any and all attorneys fees that have been 
incurred in this suit. Insurance companies are quasi public in 
nature. Their obligations go beyond meeting the reasonable 
expectations of coverage. The insurance company acted 
unreasonably, and in violation of its public duties and its 
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responsibilities, therefore, it should be responsible for the 
attorneys fees incurred herein. Defendants attorney, Mark S. 
Miner, testified in open court as to the time spent in court, 
pre-trial procedures, preparing the instructions (Tr-757). 
THE "NUNC PRO TUNC" JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID 
"Nunc Pro Tunc" is Latin, meaning now for then. It is a 
phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when 
they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the 
same effect as if regularly done. Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind. 
95, 31 N.E. 670. 
A "Nunc Pro Tunc" entry is an entry made now, of something 
which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the 
former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the 
court, but to supply an omission in the record of action really 
had where entry thereof was omitted through inadvertence or 
mistake. Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 392, 114 N.E. 713. 
A judgment "Nunc Pro Tunc" may not enlarge the rights or a 
party nor may it be used to reduce a prescribed time period of to 
defeat the right to take an appeal. See Kettner v. Snow, supra; 
Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing, supra. In the 
instant case GMAC gave no notice that the "Nunc Pro Tunc" 
judgment had been signed, hence, the Plaintiff's rights were 
enlarged and the defendants were deprived of their right to 
appeal. It was long after the defendants right of appeal had 
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expired before the defendants learned of the signing of the 
"February 5, 1982" judgment. Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules 
was grossly violated by the plaintiff herein. Certainly until 
notice of the signing of the judgment was given there was no 
judgment which could be appealed from. The file is devoid of any 
notice hence the "Nunc Pro Tunc" judgments should be held to be 
void. 
CONCLUSION 
The June 23, 1986 Order and Judgment violated Rule 2.9 of 
the District Court Rules and should be set aside. The "Nunc Pro 
Tunc" judgment was a void judgment and should be held to be void. 
The judgment for attorney fees is void in that it awards 
appellate fees for a case that was never appealed; in addition 
thereto, the record is devoid of any evidence of work done or the 
reasonable value thereof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
fofcjU.fej. 
MARK S . MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
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Jay V. Barney, Esq. 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
William J. Hansen, Esq. 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt lake City, Utah 84101 
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Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
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MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for the Defendants 
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera 
525 Newhouse Building 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~—00O00 
General Motors Acceptance No* 18072 
Corporation, a New York 
Corporation, F I L E D 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
May 24, 1983 
v* 
Hector Martinez and Manuel M. 
Rivera
 f 
Defendants and Appellants, Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
v* 
Great Equity Life Insurance 
Company of Chicago, Illinois; 
Streator Chevrolet Company, 
Incorporated, Al Barrutia, 
Brent H. Jensen, and E. C. 
Ros©borough, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents* 
STEWART, Justice: 
.This is an action by General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration (GMAC) for repossession of an automobile and for damages 
arising from the defendant's default on his promissory note 
given for the purchase of the automobile. Defendant, Hector 
Martinez, and his father, Manuel M. Rivera, filed, a third-party 
complaint against Great Equity Insurance Co* to enforce a 
credit insurance policy written to insure the amount of the 
loan after Martinez9 default because of illness* The trial 
court entered judgment in favor of GMAC and against Martinez 
and Rivera, and against Martinez and Rivera on their third-
party complaint against Great Equity. The only issue on 
this appeal is whether a pre-existing illness clause in the 
insurance policy excluded Hector Martinez from coverage 
under the policy* 
On September 12, 1978, Hector Martinez purchased an 
automobile on a conditional sales contract from Streator 
Chevrolet. Martinez was told that as a condition of obtain-
ing a financing contract he had to purchase a credit life and 
disability insurance policy from Great Equity* The policy 
designated Martinez as the insured and Streator as the 
beneficiary, and provided that if because of death, accident, 
or illness Martinez was unable to make his car payments, 
Great Equity would pay the remainder of the debt then owing. 
The premium for the policy was added to the face of the 
sales contract for the car, and the contract was later 
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assigned by Streator Chevrolet to GMAC, making GMAC the new 
beneficiary under the policy. 
At the time Martinez purchased the insurance, he did 
not learn about the exclusion for pre-existing conditions• 
Streator98 agent, Mr* Elton, did not ask him about his past or 
present health. Martinez was not asked to sign the credit 
Insurance application, which stated the coverage exclusions, 
nor was he given a copy of the Insurance application or the 
certificate of Insurance, although it was Streator's normal 
business practice to have an Insured sign the application 
and to give him a copy of the Insurance certificate. Appa-
rently, Mr. Elton was unable at the time to find the blank 
credit insurance certificates. Nor were any of the policy 
exclusions explained to Martinez orally* 
The Insurance certificate states the policy exclu-
sions. The "pre-existing condition* exclusion provides: "No 
insurance is provided hereunder * * - if disability results 
from . . • Injury sustained or sickness contracted for which 
medical diagnosis or treatment was required . . . within six 
months prior to the effective date [of coverage] of this 
certificate and which causes a loss within six months after 
such effective date*" 
Although It is undisputed that Martinez suffered 
from high blood pressure prior to his purchase of the Insurance 
policy, Martinez, did not misstate or misrepresent his state 
of health* On the contrary* the agent who filled out the 
Great Equity insurance application form seemed totally indif-
ferent to Martinez1 prior health* ^ 
Martinez made two monthly payments on the car 
prior to suffering a complete kidney failure which resulted 
in his total disability. He then made a demand on the 
insurance company to pay the balance owing on the car to 
GMAC* Pending the outcome of the insurance company's investi-
gation, GMAC deferred collection on its contract. As a result 
of its investigation. Great Equity denied coverage on the ground 
that Martinez had suffered high blood pressure prior to his 
purchase of the car, and the subsequent kidney failure fell 
within the exclusionary clause of the policy for pre-existing 
diseases. 
GMAC then brought this suit against Martinez. 
Martinez filed a third-party complaint against Great Equity 
alleging that it was liable under the insurance contract for 
the car payments. Great Equity admitted the existence of 
the insurance contract and denied coverage under the pre-
existing sickness exclusion* 
The trial court granted judgment against Martinez 
as a matter of law on the contract for the purchase of the 
car, and awarded GMAC $4,717.50 plus interest, costs, and 
attorney's fees* On the issue of Great Equity's lia-""* 
bility under the policy, the trial court submitted seven 
special interrogatories to the jury. Based on the answers 
to those interrogatories, the trial court entered judgment 
for Great Equity. 
In 1961 the Legislature enacted the Model Act for 
the Regulation of Credit Life Insurance and Credit Accident 
and Health Insurance. Laws of Utah 1961, Chap. 67, $1. That 
act is now found in Title 31, Chap. 34 of U.C.A., 1953. Section 
31-34-6(1) states: 
All credit, life insurance and credit; acci-
dent and health, insurance shall be evidenced 
by an individual policy, or in the case of 
group insurance by a certificate of insurance, 
which • • . shall be delivered to the debtor. 
Subsection 2 of that provision specifies what information must 
be included in the individual policy or group certificate 
issued to the debtor. Among other things, the policy or 
group certificate must state the "term and coverage including 
any exceptions, limitations and restrictions•" 
Credit life and accident insurance are generally 
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at arms 
length and which usually contain various provisions for 
protection of the interests of the insurance company. 
Because those who purchase such policies rely on the assumption 
that 'they are covered by the insurance they buy, the Legis-
lature, in the interest of fair dealing, has deemed it 
mandatory that an Insured be given a copy of the policy so 
that he can take whatever action is appropriate to protect 
his Interests and be assured that the coverage which he 
thinks he has contracted for is actually provided.* It is 
not consonant with our statute for an Insurance company to 
accept premiums and then deny liability on the ground of an 
exclusion of which the Insured was not aware because the 
insurance company had never informed him of the exclusion 
or given him the means to ascertain its existence. 
The purpose of the statutory provision is plain: 
the insured is entitled to be informed in writing of the 
essential terms of the insurance contract, especially the 
exclusionary terms. Because of the reliance that people place 
on credit insurance policies to mitigate the hardships that 
often result from inability to pay a debt, the policy of the 
law is to prevent mistake or misunderstanding as to the terms 
of the insurance contract, or what in some cases may amount 
to sharp practice. Frieze v. West American Insurance Co., 
188 F.2d 331, 334-335 (8th Cir. 1951) (applying California 
law). See also Colvin v. Louisiana Hospital Service, Inc«, La. 
App.
 f 321 So. 2d 416 (1975)j Traders & General Insurance Co. 
v« Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 158, 
278 P.2d 493, 495 (1955). 
In view of these reasons and the unequivocal 
nature of the duty imposed by $31-34-6, we hold that an 
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insurance company is estopped from relying upon an exclusion 
in a policy if the company has failed to deliver the policy 
or certificate of insurance to the insured or any other 
document stating the exclusion-
Gardner v. League Life Insurance Co., 48 Mich. App. 
574, 210 N.w.2d 897 (1973), was decided under facts almost 
identical to those that exist in the instant case and is 
wholly consistent with the result we reach. The insurer 
sought to avoid paying on a credit insurance policy because 
of an exclusionary clause In the policy which had never been 
delivered to the insured*. At the time Michigan had a credit 
insurance act similar to Utah's credit life and accident 
insurance act* The particular provision which imposed the 
duty to deliver a copy of the policy was identical to 
$31-34-6(1).. The court construed the Michigan statutory 
provision to mandate delivery and held that the insurance 
company was- estopped from relying on the policy exclusion 
because of Its failure to comply with the act. 
Hayes Trucfc Lines. Inc. v. Investors Insurance Corp.. 
257 Or. 602,. 525 P.2d 1289 (1974), is also squarely on point. 
The insurer denied liability on an exclusion in a credit 
insurance policy for a pre-existing disability. The Insur-
ance agent had not inquired as to the status of the Insured's 
health; the Insured had not signed or received an application 
for insurance or a certificate of insurance; and the insured 
had relied on representations, by the insurance company that 
he was insured* The court held that as a matter of law 
the insurance company was liable* 
The result reached in the instant case ie also con-
sistent with the rule laid down by a number of courts that a 
certificate of Insurance or other literature given an insured 
describing the coverage controls over a master policy sot 
delivered to the insured. E.g.. Life Insurance Co* v. Lee, 
519 P.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1975); Lecker v. General American Life 
Insurance Co., 55 Hawaii 624, 525 P.2d 1114 (1974); Republic""" 
National Life Insurance Co. v. Blann, 400 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1966). See also 6 A.L.R. 4th 839-842 (1981), and 
cases discussed therein. 
Great Equity in this case concedes that Martine2 
did not sign the application for insurance, which contained 
the exclusionary language and was made out by its agent at 
the time Martinez paid his premium, and that Martinez was 
not told at that time, or at any time, -of the exclusion. 
It asserts, however, that it sent Martinez a copy of the 
policy. Great Equity's contention that the policy was sent 
to Martinez is supported by the testimony of its agent who 
testified that although he could not recall the transaction 
with Martinez, a copy of the policy is normally sent two or 
three days after the paper work of the sale is completed. 
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On the other hand, Martinez and his father testified that 
no copy was received. 
The jury was not requested in so many words to 
determine specifically whether the policy had been sent. 
However, a special interrogatory did pose the question 
whether Martinez either knew or should have known about the 
exclusion. On this question, the jury did not answer in 
Great Equity's favor. Since Great Equity had the burden of 
proof and of persuasion with respect to establishing the 
exclusion and because Great Equity failed to meet those 
burdens, the only logical conclusion is that Martinez did 
not know, nor should he have known of.the exclusion. 
Finally, Great Equity contends that defendants 
should have been aware of the exclusion because it is "standard 
in the industry." That conclusion does not follow. Martinez 
had not worked in the insurance industry and could hardly 
have known what was standard in the industry. Further, Great 
Equity's argument would, for practical purposes, render 
531-34-6 a nullity since the contention that proof of what 
is standard in the industry is sufficient to bind an insured 
is fundamentally at odds with $31-34-6. *[T]he need for 
notice is beyond peradventure." Gardner v. League Life 
Insurance Co.. supra. 48 Mich. App. at 577, 210 N.w.2d at 
891T 
Although estoppel is usually a factual defense, it 
may be established as a matter of law to preclude an insurance 
company from relying on an exclusion in a credit life and 
accident policy. Hayes Truck Lines. Inc. v. Investors Ins. 
Co., 269 Or. 565, 525 P.2d 1289 (1974); Scribner v. Equitable 
Life % Casualty Insurance Co.. 257 Or. 602, 481 P.2d 76 
(1971). On the facts of this case, Great Equity is estopped 
as a matter of law from denying coverage under the policy. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the 
case remanded for entry of judgment against Great Equity and 
in favor of Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera. 
Costs to appellants. 
WE CONCUR: 
OAKS, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I cannot agree that the insurance carrier is "estopped 
as a matter of law" from relying on the exclusions in its policy 
because a copy of the policy was not delivered to the debtor-
insured. Although the Model Act directs that a copy be 
delivered to the debtor-Insured, U.C.A., 1953, S 31-34-6(1), 
nothing in that section or in the Act as a whole directs or 
indicates an intent to rescind the policy exclusions if this 
requirement is not met* That drastic result should not be 
decreed by this Court without explicit legislative direction. 
The majority's decision Injects a new provision into 
insurance contracts9 a provision whose effects are almost 
impossible to gauge but potentially far-reaching- An agentfs 
failure to deliver a policy or certificate would apparently 
rescind all policy exclusions, since the majority's reasoning 
offers no basis to distinguish one exclusion from another* 
On this insurance contract, that would extend the policy cover-
age to disabilities resulting from intentionally self-inflicted 
injuries* flight in nonscheduled aircraft, war or military 
service, and normal pregnancy•> As to life insurance, It would 
Impose coverage for deaths caused by suicide* 
The potential effects of the majority's decision 
are even more far-reaching- The rationale that the Insured 
"is entitled to be Informed in writing of the essential terms 
of the insurance contract" apparently applies to terms of limi-
tation, as well as to terms of exclusion* Consequently, the" 
majority's holding suggests that an Lnarxrnd who could convince 
a jury that he had not received a copy .of the policy might 
enforce this policy without regard to its provisions on maximum 
age, gainful employment, limitation of one death benefit in 
the case of cosigners, and even to some unspecified point beyond 
the dollar limits of $15,000 on death benefits and disability 
payments- Other policy provisions, such as the critical defi-
nition of "total disability,1' would also seem to come under 
the majority's interdiction if sought to be applied against 
the insured. 
The uncertainties introduced by the majority's deci-
sion will provoke litigation and frustrate the kind of loss 
predictions that are essential to the stability of the insurance 
industry* 
The district court's judgment in favor of the insur-
ance company on the basis of the policy exclusion should be 
affirmed* 
Hall, Chief Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Oaks. 
\T^> * o r*»-»o - £ ? -
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Jay E. Jensen 
William J. Hansen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company, 
Streator Chevrolet, Barrutia and 
Jensen 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 355-3431 
FILED IN CLEPK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lakr County, Utah 
SEP 2:, 1981 
w. r^y g, -s . e y zt<t o.«. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a Nev York 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED; AL BARRUTIA, 
BRENT H. JENSEN, and E. E. 
ROSEBOROUGH, 
Third-Party 
Defendants 
Civil No. C-79-4797 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
in the above-entitled court before the Honorable Dean E. Condor, 
on September 3, 1981. The plaintiff appeared through its counsel, 
Jay V. Barney, the. defendants by their counsel, Mark S. Miner; 
and the third-party defendants through their counsel, William J. 
Hansen.' A jury was duly impaneled. Evidence was introduced, the 
jury instructed, and the matter being fully argued, the case was 
submitted to the jury, which upon due deliberation returned and 
made the following: 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We the jury in the above-entitled action, find from a 
preponderance of the evidence, the answers to the questions pro-
pounded to as as follows: 
EXHIBIT "B" 
1. Was thare prasant in tha disability policy obtained 
by tha daftndant a pre-existing condition exclusion which excluded 
covarage if « reasonably prudent parson knew or should have known 
of an injury or sicknass or if Hector Martinez knew or should 
have known of en Injury or sicknass that required medical diagnosis 
or treatment within six moncha prior to tha purchasa of tha policy. 
Yes JC_ Ho 
If your answer to question 1 was "yes," then answer tha 
following questions. If your answer to question 1 was "no" than 
do nor anawar tha following questions. 
2* Did Hector Martinez know or should ha have known of 
tha pre-existing physical condition exclusion referred to in 
question 1. ^ r> A~— 
Taa Ho aseag Yes J>_ Ho * 
3- Wae tha pre-existing condition exclusion referred 
cp in question 1 a standard provision in tha industry such that a 
reasonably prudent parson or Hector Martinez should have been 
aware of tha provision 
Yes JC_ Ho 
If your anawar to question 2 or 3 was "yes," then answer 
question 4. If your anawar to questions 2 and 3 was "nov" than 
do not answer tha following questions. 
4. Did Hector Martinez have an injury or illness for 
which medical diagnosis or treatment was required. 
Yes JC_ No 
5. Did Hector Martinez know of the injury or sickness 
or would a reasonably prudent person have known of the injury or 
sickness and have sought medical diagnosis or treatment vithin 
six months prior to purchasing tha disability policy. 
Yes JC_ No 
If you answered questions 4 and 5 "yes," then answer 
question 6. If you answered "no" to question 4 or 5 then do not 
answer the following question. 
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6. Did tha injury or sickness of Mr. Martinez cause a 
loss within six tnonths after the effective date of the disability 
policy. 
Yes JC_ No 
If you answered question 6 "yes" then answer question 7. 
If your answer to question 6 was "no" than do not answer the 
following question* 
7. Did Hector Martinez become totally disabled? 
Yes X No 
WHEREFORE, upon notion of the defendants, and good 
cause appearing, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
third-party defendants have judgment against tha third-party 
plaintiff on their complaint of no cause of action. 
DATED this 1 i day of September, 1981. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
f??' 'ATTEST 
v w. jramjNii IVANS 
7 M y C M 
J 
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MARK S . MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-1449 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IK AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL 
RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
GREAT EQUITY LITE INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al., ] 
Third-Party Defendants. 
i ORDER 
• Civil No. C-79-4797 
On September 22,. 1983 at 8:00 a.m. there came on 
regularly for hearing the Motion of" Great Equity Life Insurance 
Company for clarification of judgment and the Motion of GMAC 
and Streator Chevrolet for judgment to provide additional 
attorney's fees. Jay V. Barney appeared for GMAC, Mark S. Miner 
appeared for Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, and William F. 
Hansen appeared for Great Equity Life Insurance Company. The 
matter was set for hearing on August 19, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. and 
was contintued until September 22, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. Jay V. Barney 
gave Notice on August 25, 1983 that the matter would be continued 
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to September 1, 1983. Mark S. Miner represented to the Court that 
he verily believed that all matters were continued until the 22nd 
day of September, 1983 at 8:00 a.m. by reason of the fact that 
William F. Hansen was out of town. The matter was duly argued 
and submitted to the Court for its hearing and determination. The 
Court being advised of the premises herein, now makes the following 
Order. 
OHDEH 
After argument of counsel and a review of the memorandums 
and Supreme Court opinion in the above case, this Court finds that 
the plaintiff ys judgment against defendants Martinez and Rivera 
still stands. The Supreme Court only considered and reversed the 
issue on insurance coverage between the defendants and Great 
Equity Life Insurance. Since the motion for additional attorney's 
fees was presented by a motion before this Court on September 1, 1983, 
and defendant's counsel failed to appear at said hearing, this Court 
will stand on its ruling at that time and grant the additional 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of September, 1983. 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
± 
-2-
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15 THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LASS COUNT! 
STATS OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE ': NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
CORPORATION, a New York UTAH SUPREME COURT 
corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HECTOR MARTINEZ, and 
MANUEL X. RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
-vs-
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS: STREATER CHEVRO-
LET COUPANT, INCORPORATED, : 
AL aARHUTIA, BRENT H. 
JENSEN, and S. C. ROSE-
BOROUGH, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. Civil No. C-79-4797 
Notice is hereby.given that Hector Martinez and 
Manuel M. Rivera hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah from the Judgment and Order entered by the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 23rd of September, 1981, 
which granted a Judgment of No Cause of Action based on a 
Jury Verdict. The appeal is taken on the law and the fact 
and appeal is taken on the Judgment in that the Jury rendered 
a verdict of 3 to 3 in favor of the defendants. Said appeal 
is taken further on the Order made and entered on October 5, 
1981, In which the Court granted a motion dismissing Streater 
^ > / EXHIBIT 'V 
MARE S. MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-1449 
EXHIBIT "D" 32S 
Qievrolet Company, Incorporated, Brent Jensen and Al Barru-
tia, with prejudice. Said appeal is taken on the law and 
the facts; and the case and the cause in itm entirety. 
„ I/SHA/ 
Attorney for 
and Manuel H. Rivera 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
to: 
Jay B. Barney, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
4294 Poplar Street 
Hurray, Utah 84107 
Dale J. Lambert. Esq. 
William J. Hansen, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law 
900 learns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and that said Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
was duly served according to law on this // day of 
October, 1981. 
Q.A A 0 <K fyJ&U 
2-
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KXHIRTT f fF* 
c u y i i ' 
Jay V. Barney 
DAY, BARNEY 6 TYCXSEN 
At torneys for P l a i n t i f f 
45 East Vine S t r e e t 
Murray, Utah B41Q7 
Telephones (801) 262-6800 
fttXO m CLERK'S Q*ffCf 
SALTL/^ COUKTY.UTtK 
Fa 5 8 » W ' R 
«. maun* SYAMS CURE 
JiiOiST. COURT 
M y 4 . < * A c v. * 
~ ' ' ytfvTY CUR* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New Yorlc 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs» 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL 
RIVERA, 
De fendant s , 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, a t . a l . , 
"hird-Party Defendants . 
AJ US A*. 3+'/ 
JUDGMENT 
civil NO. c-m-mn 
The above-entitled case having coae hefors •the District 
Court on the 3th day of September, 1981 for trial, sitting with 
a jury, and Plaintiff, at the conclusion of ail the evidence, 
having aade a Motion for judgement in its favor and against 
Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manual Rivera, and the Court 
having duly considered said Motion and having granted the sane, 
and the Court having entered its Findings of Pact and 
Conclusions of Law now herewith grants judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel 
?.ivera in the sua of $4,717*50 together with interest from and 
afi'jr Seotember 30, 1981 at the rate of fourteen and 55/100 
percent (14.55 t) annual percentage rate until payment thereof 
together «*ith costs of court in the amount of S127.Q0 and 
attorney's fcas in the sum of $2,500.00. 
DATED this f day of Dececaber, 1981. 
*./s/ft 
DEAN E. CONDOR 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
EXHIBIT "F* 
A " E S T 
Vt, C*"rnclNG T.AN3 
EXHIBIT 'XT' FILES »N C~r 
OPHCu 
3 « K t^fcc «;;, .-nty Oia.*« 
Jay V. Barney 
DAY, BARNEY 6 TYCXSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 Ease Vina Street 
Murray, Utan 84107 
Telephone: 262-6800 
Sir 22 i3o3 
O«0un C*** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMD fOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New YorK 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-fi-
tfECTOR MARTINEZ, tt al( 
Defandants. 
GREAT EQUITY LirE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-79-4797 
The above-entitled case having coee before the District 
Court on the 8th day of September, 1981, for trial, sitting with 
a jury, and plaintiff at the conclusion of all the tvidence 
having nade a notion for judgment in its favor and against 
defendants Hector Martinex and Manuel Rlvara, and the Court 
having duly considsred said eotion and having granted the aaae, 
and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and the Court further having heard the notion of counsel 
for plaintiff to eodify and aaend tne judgment to allow for an 
additional $1,000.00 attorney's fees as a consequence of efforts 
EXHIBIT "G" 
axpandad by plaintiff's counsal in dafending an appaai by 
dafandants and otharvisa baxng advisad in tha praaisaa, now 
naravith grant* judgaant in favor of plaintiff and against 
dafandanta Bactor Martina* and Manual ftivara, in tna sua of 
$4,717.30, togathar vita intaraat from and aftar Saptaabar 30, 
1981, at tha rata of 14.3S% annual parcantaga rata until payaant 
tharaof, and coats of court in tha aaount of $127.00, and 
attornay'a faaa in tha sua of $3500.00. 
0AT2O this "LI-day of Saptaabar, 1983. 
oaan s. usndar 
District Judga 
ATTEST 
H.optfaiwpCi»r 
m
— : • / ****** 
OCRTiriCATf Of OSUVCHt 
I haraby cartify that a trua and corract copy of tna 
foragoing Amandad Judgaant vaa placad with Tha ftunnar Sarvica 
rrRS* for dalivary tot 
*arfc S. Minor, Attornay for Oafandant 
S2S ^awnousa Building, Salt Lafca City, Utah 84111 
ttilliaa F. Banaan, Attornay for third-Party Dafandants 
900 Kaarns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lafca City, Otafr 84101 
on this day of Sapcaabar, 1963. 
D A V I D H. DAY 
JAY V. BARNEY 
ROBERT C. L I L J E N Q U I S T 
PHIL I. IP B. S H E L L 
DAY & B A R N E Y 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
<*5 EAST V I N E STREET 
M U R R A Y , U T A H 8 4 1 0 7 
TELEPHONE: 
(801) 262-6600 
J u n e 2 3 , 1986 
Mr. William J* Hanson 
Attorney at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
S.L.C., UT 84101 
Mark S. Miner 
Attorney at Law 
525 Newhouse Building 
S.L.C., Ut 8411 1 
Dear Bill and Mark: 
Re; General Motors Acceptance Corp. 
vs. Hector Martinez vs. Great 
Equity Life Insurance. 
On June 23f 1986, I went to the Court to determine the 
status of Entry of Judgment and the Order heretofore submitted by 
myself to Judge Conder. 
Robbie advised that he recalled that the Certification Order 
of Mr* Miner had been signed but could not recall on the 
Judgment. I therefore checked with the clerk's office and could 
not locate the Order or Judgment in process nor was the same 
found in Judge Conder1s office. 
I therefore provided the Judge with an original typed copy 
from our word processor of the Order and Judgment and had the 
same signed on June 23, 1986. 
I do not know whether the Judgment and Order previously 
submitted was signed following the hearing and could not be 
located by the clerk with whom I spoke or whether the same has 
been lost. It may well be that a judgment was signed before June 
23, 1986. Inasmuch as there may be an appeal in this case, I 
point this out to counsel for your review of the Court record 
rather than relying on this document as being the first Entry of 
Judgment. 
EXHIBIT MH" 
ooo' l<tfl 
Page 2 
Because this same document had been previously submitted for 
signature by the Court and represents the same document which was 
in issue before the Court on Tuesday, June 17, 1986, I have 
stricken the right to object within ten (10) days inasmuch as the 
Objection concerning this has already been heard. 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me* 
Again, I advise you to check the court file to see whether a 
Judgment might have been entered earlier than the 23rd of June, 
1986. 
Sincerely, 
DAY & BARNEY 
JVB:sw 
V^J^arney (I 
OG^° St 
. ! , W 30 !0 us AHfB6 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ) 
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a 
New York corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL RIVERA, ] 
Defendants. ) 
vs. ] 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, STREATOR ] 
CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC., 
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT H. 
JENSEN, and E. ROSEBO ROUGH, ) 
Third Party Defendants. 
i NOTICE OF INTENT 
) TO APPEAL TO 
' UTAH SUPREME COURT 
) Civil No. C-79-4797 
1
 Judge Dean E. Conder 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND THE ABOVE NAMED 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS, YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE 
NOTICE: 
1. That this a t torney has diligently searched the Court files in the 
above entit led cause and has been unable to perfect his appeal by reason of the 
feet t h a t the proposed final judgment has not been siqned or has been lost in the 
EXHIBIT M I M 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
UTAH STATE BAR NO.A-2273. 
«0tf7O4 
Clerks office and has not been placed in the file; evidently, J ay V. Barney, 
Plaintiff 's at torney experienced the same problem. This at torney checked the 
clerks file June 26th, 1986; and there was no record of the Judgment therein; 
hence, an appeal therefrom was not possible. Please see Exliibit "A" which is 
annexed here to and by reference made a pa r t hereof. 
2. In view of the continuing confusicxi tha t has plagued this case; 
You are given notice tha t the defendant will appeal al l orders and judgments 
promptly as 90on as they a re placed in the file. 
3. You a re further given notice that the Order in which Judge 
Ccnder ruled tha t the defendant Hector Martinez had been tendered money by 
the Great Equity Insurance Company and the Order terminating interest will be 
appealed forthwith; therefore, you should not pay over any funds until this 
matter is ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court; Should you do so you are acting 
a t your peri l . 
Respectfully^ 
MARK S/MINER 
Attorney for the Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
ooo n& 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify tha t I mailed, postage prepaid, a t rue and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent to appeal, on this 26th day of June, 1986, 
to the following: William J. Hansen, Esq., 900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main 
Street , Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and, Jay V. Barney, Esq., 45 East Vine 
Street , Murray, Utah 84107. Said documents was duly served according t o law 
by United States Mail. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CLERK 
P.O. BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
3 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for the Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange PJace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
UTAH STATE BAR NO.A2273. 
ft \ n ! re P'J 'lil! JUL 
o Q6 
• # & > 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
r-iVA 
,uj^. 
GENERAL MOTORS 
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, 
A New York Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and, 
MANUEL M. RIVERA 
Defendants, 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 
Third Party Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Civil No. On03 6205 
C71 - ???? 
Judge Dean Conder 
Comes now Hector Martinez and Manual Rivera,Defendants and 
hereby' appeals the Order and the Judgment which was made and entered in the 
above entitled Court on or about the June 23th 1986. These Defendants further 
appeal all Orders and all Judgments tha t have been made and entered by the 
honorable Dean Conder; the above entitled Court having Certified that said 
Orders and Judgment are final Orders from which an appeal lies. These 
defendants specifically appeal from the Judgment granting attorneys fees in 
favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation and against Hector Martinez 
and Manuel M. Rivera. Appeal is further taken from the Court 's Order and 
Judgment awarding Defendants "Nunc Pro Tunc" at torney fees; Judgment dated 
December 4th, 1981; and signed February 5th, 1982; appeal is further taken from 
EXHIBIT M J " 
the Court awarding One-Thousand dollars at torney fees on September 27th, 1983; 
beca ise defendants Counsel failed to appear a t a hearing on September 1st, 
1983; and appeal is further taken from the Order of the Court tha t Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company of Chicago made a tender of a Judgment to the 
Defendants, no tender having ever been made; said Order having been signed 
June 23rd 1986; Appeal is further taken from all orders, and from all Judgments 
which wholly disposes of all claims in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for the Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manual M. Rivera 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND SERVICE 
I hereby tha t I mailed postage prepaid, a t rue and correct copy of 
the Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, on the /} day of July 
1986, to Jay B. J^arney, Attorney for General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 
45 East Vine Street , Murray, Utah 84107 and to William J. Hansen, 900 Kearns 
Building, 130 South Main Street , Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attorney for Great 
Equity Life Insurance Company of Chicago, I further certify tha t said Notice of 
Appeal was duly served according to lajw by^Jri ted States Mail. 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for the Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
2 
FILEB IN CLMK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lak« City, Utah 
JAY V. BARNEY (0224) 
DAY & BARNEY 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
45 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE: 262-6800 
H. Oixcn 
By 
AUG 18 1986 
KJn0la^C»erkard Dist. ( 
^ (MrnM)a 
\N> Deputy Cl< 
Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
— v s — 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL RIVERA, 
Defendants. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C-79-4797 
The above-entitled case came before the Court pursuant to 
notice on Friday, the 16th day of May, 1986, the Honorable Dean 
E. Conder, Judge, presiding. Mr. Jay V. Barney appeared on 
behalf of plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC), Mr. Mark Miner appeared on behalf of defendants and Mr. 
William J. Hansen appeared on behalf of third-party defendant 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company of Chicago (Great Equity). 
At issue before the court were the questions of interest, 
attorney's fees and judgment to be entered as between defendants 
and third-party plaintiff, Great Equity. Also at issue were the 
EXHIBIT "K" 
& & 
claims of plaintiff for additional attorney's fees to be awarded 
against defendants and the right of plaintiff to receive payment 
from third-party defendant Great Equity as a satisfaction of the 
obligation, which Great Equity Life may owe to defendant. 
The claims of plaintiff had been brought before the court at 
an earlier time and ruling thereon had been deferred for consid-
eration of issues remaining between defendants and third party 
defendant Great Equity. 
Whereupon, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel 
and having reviewed documents, as well as memoranda submitted, 
and being advised in the premises, now herewith Orders: 
1. Plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment against 
defendants in the same manner and in accordance with that certain 
Amended Judgment heretofore entered in the above-entitled Court 
on the 22nd day of September, 1983, namely for the sum of 
$4,717.50, together with interest from and after September 30, 
1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage rate until payment 
thereof and together with costs of court in the amount of $127.00 
and attorney's fees fixed in the sum of $3,500.00. Plaintifffs 
claim for additional attorneyfs fees for services performed 
subsequent to the date of that judgment is denied. 
2. That defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera are 
entitled to judgment against third-party defendant Great Equity 
Life in the sum of $4,717.50, together with interest from and 
after September 30, 1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage 
rate, accruing up to and including November 7, 1983/ and together 
with costs in the sum of $742,85. No attorney's fees are awarded 
and the request of defendant for attorney's fees as against Great 
Equity are specifically denied. 
3. That the offer in writing by Great Equity Life of 
November 7f 1983f together with its submission of checks for 
payment of principal/ interest and costsf constituted a tender 
within the meaning of Section 78-27-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953)/ 
and Great Equity therefore has no responsibility for interest to 
defendants from and after November 7f 1983. 
4. That inasmuch as plaintiff/ GMAC/ has judgment against 
defendants in an amount greater than the judgment which defen-
dants have against Great Equity Life/ payment by Great Equity 
Life directly to GMAC of all or any portion of the judgment in 
favor of GMAC and against defendants shall constitute a satis-
faction to the extent of payment made of any portion of the 
judgment existing in favor of defendants and against Great 
Equity. 
DATED this l£ day of ($>l£***4/, 1986. 
Distr 
ATTEST 
H
- DIXON HINDLEY 
By . 
OK*** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF OBJECTION 
I, Jay V. Barney, hereby certify that I did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order to be placed in the United 
States mails for mailing to: 
Mark S. Miner, Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William J. Hansen, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this -gift day of May, 1986. 
I further do herewith give notice that said Order was duly 
delivered to the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 30 clay of May, 
1986 and that the parties hereto have 10 days in which to file 
objections to the Order as to form or content and failing to do 
so that said Order shall be entered. 
DATED this Q.0 day of May, 1986. 
\yf J. BarAey ~PT 
~
4
" *f& 0U° 
JAY V. BARNEY (0224) 
DAY & BARNEY 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
45 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE: 262-6800 
FILEB IN CUM'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
A(JG l$ 1986 
H. Dixcn HiwJtoy^jerkjrd Oist. Court 
By 
utVCI< J_ Dep y lerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
gj*Q9w&C> 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
--vs— 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL RIVERA, 
Defendants. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
hi J \\ o GJ$ ¥ ^ T 
1\ C i ^ l No. C-79-4|797 
The above-entitled case having come before the District 
Court on the 8th day of September, 1981, for trial, sitting with 
a jury, and plaintiff at the conclusion of all the evidence 
having made a motion for judgment in its favor and against 
defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, and the Court 
having duly considered said motion and having granted the same, 
and the Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law with respect thereto, and certain aspects of the case 
having been further reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court, and 
matters having been remanded to the District Court for further 
EXHIBIT ML" 
e>oj sfl" S 
decision, and the Court having considered motions and arguments 
of counsel relative to proceedings occurring subsequent to the 
entry of decision by the Court with respect to plaintiff, as well 
as motions raised before the Court from the respective parties, 
and being fully advised in the premises, now herewith grants 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants and in 
favor of defendants and against Great Equity Life Insurance 
Company of Chicago, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff shall have and is herewith granted judgment 
against defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera, in the sum 
of $4,717.50, together with interest from and after September 30, 
1981 at the rate of 14.55% annual percentage rate, until the same 
is fully paid, and together with costs of court in the sum of 
$127.00, and for attorney's fees fixed at the sum of $3,500.00. 
2. That defendants Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera are 
herewith granted judgment against defendant Great Equity Life 
Insurance Company in the sum of $4,717.50, together with interest 
from and after September 30, 1981, at the rate of 14.55% annual 
percentage rate, which interest rate shall accrue on the princi-
pal sum at said rate up to and including November 7, 1983, and 
defendants are further granted costs in the sum of $742.85, and 
no attorney's fees are awarded. 
3. That any payment which third-party defendant Great 
Equity Life may pay to General Motors Acceptance Corporation as a 
consequence of these proceedings shall constitute, to the extent 
-
2
- &*& 
of the payment thereof, a satisfaction of such portion of the 
judgment of defendants' against Great Equity Life, 
DATED this /ff day of ^ e ^ s ^ ^ T 1986. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By \LC\^nh^f^ 
Clerk Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF OBJECTION 
I, Jay V. Barney, hereby certify that I did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to be placed in the United 
States mails for mailing to: 
Mark S. Miner, Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William J. Hansen, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
900 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this ^0 day of Mayf 1986. 
I further do herewith give notice that said Judgment was 
duly delivered to the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the JL/V^day of 
May, 1986 and that the parties hereto have 10 days in which to 
file objections to the Judgment as to form or content and failing 
to do so that said Order shall be entered. 
DATED this '^ day of May, 1986. 
-3-
M1" j?e 600* Form 1Q3 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
f : \ _€oMrrt^>f Salt Lake - State of Utah 
v
 P-amt'tt * \ 
" - ' "endant A Def  
CASE NO: r, 7-i - s - i ^ i 
Type of hearing: Div 
Present:^ Pitt 
P. Atty:-J 
D. Atty: ('1/1 • j ' V u f W - / z 
Annul. 
Deft._ 
Supp. Order_ OSC Other_ 
CO/ H c y v ^ ^ ,vL-y/ 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf: 
Others: 
Deft:. 
Summons, 
Waiver 
Stipulation, 
Publication... 
G Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: Lp /37 f t £ . 
Judge: 
Clerk: 
Reporter: __ 
Bailiff: 
^XL mi 
& cScw\Vcrt 
V -
ORDERS: 
G Custody Evaluation Ordered 
G Visitation Rights 
L_ Custody Awarded To 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office: 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year G Alimony Waived 
Atty. fees to the 
Home To: 
in the amount of L_ Deferred 
Furnishings To: 
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
Restraining Order Entered Against 
.Automobile To: 
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
Divorce Granted To As 
Decree To Become Final: G Upon Entry 
Former Name of 
G 3-Month Interlocutory 
Is Restored 
Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable . Bail. 
D/ 
Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Based on written otipulQtion of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counoel, court orders 
\\t\Q*> O V Y J P A 
\sda/vv\2yy\h 
15 .. tqa& CK AA A \\fijU 
1£L \C\ P)& rx^jf'j " M u O O rif^A 
'1 OJ^ e^aA U i d j q J " £ A . 
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SlrjM.Q.rf grtrto/lft- ""^Vlc. "fHi/yuA fr> ^/UJQ&ACL J&A Qf\ . 
EXHIBIT "M" 
oLP G V3/S 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-1449 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
-vs-
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS, STREATOR CHEVRO-
LET COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT JENSEN, 
and E. C. ROSEBOROUGH, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs. 
WRIT UNDERTAKING BOND 
Case No, C-79-4797 
WHEREAS, the plaintiff herein is seeking to obtain 
possession of defendant's automobile; and, 
WHEREAS, under the law, Hector Martinez is entitled 
to possession of said automobile; and, 
WHEREAS, under the law, Hector Martinez is entitled 
to retain possession of the automobile which the plain-
tiff seeks to wrongfully take, and pending a hearing 
of said cause on its merits; the defendant being entitled 
to possession and seeking possession of said car in 
order to comply with the law and retain possession of 
said automobile; and, 
WHEREAS, Hector Martinez's desires of having said 
automobile and personal property delivered to him , and 
EXHIBIT nN' 
-2-
for an Order of Delivery of said property, and to comply 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures and the Statutes 
therein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, we, the undersigned, residents of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in consideration of 
the premises, and of the delivery of the automobile to 
the defendant herein, we do, jointly and severally, under-
take and promise and acknowledge ourselves jointly and 
severally bound to the plaintiff, General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation, a Financial Corporation, in the sum 
of $6,000; that the said Hector Martinez shall duly 
prosecute said action, we solemnly agree to pay costs 
and damages, which may be awarded against him, and to 
return the property to the General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, should the above-entitled Court order Hector 
Martinez to do so, 
DATED this fL1 day of August, 1979, 
^UQflgTINK LOPEZ, SOftETJT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0 n t n e
 / '? day of August, 1979, there personally 
appeared before me, Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez, the 
sureties of Hector Martinez and Manuel M, Rivera, in the 
* 
.ft vumx 
'p? AMKKICAN 
(il^^S^ii^^? 
I N S U R A N C E I O M I' \ N I > s \ M O - i 
,l_\> 0 \ j P i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, 
A NEW YORK CORPORATION 679- W7 
Plaintiff 
vs . UNDERTAKING ON CLAIM AND 
DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
HECTOR MARTINEZ AND MANUEL M. RIVERA 
Defendant 
WHEREAS, it is alleged by the Plaintiff in his complaint and affidavit in the 
above entitled action, that the Defendant in the said action has in his possession and 
wrongfully detains certain personal property, as follows, to wit! One (1) 1977 Chevrole 
Ma 11 hit, 7 Annr, r<»df seHal no. 111171,77407 S6, bearing Utah license no. LVft 469 
of the value nf THREE THOUSAND AND NO/100 • nmrAPg rs 3000.00 ^ 
belonging to the said Plaintiff, to the possession of which the said Plaintiff is lawful 
ly entitled, or the value nf SIX THOUSAND AND NO/100 ^ I b r c ($ 6000.00 ^ 
AND WHEREAS, the said Plaintiff, being desirous of having the said personal 
property delivered to him and by endorsement in writing upon the affidavit, has required 
the Sheriff of otaiaOoutrapcxtft any County in the , State of Utah, 
to take the said property from the said Defendant, 
NOW, THEREFORE, we the undersigned, NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION 
consideration of the premises, and of the delivery of the said property to the said 
Plaintiff, do hereby undertake and acknowledge to the effect that we are jointly and 
severally bound in the sum nf SIX THOUSAND AND NO/100 
Dollars ($ 6000.00 ) being double the value of said property, as stated in the 
affidavit, for the prosecution of the said action, for the return of the said property t 
the said Defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the said 
Defendant of such sum as may, from any cause, be recovered against the said Plaintiff. 
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION submits itself to the jurisdiction of the 
District Court above and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the said court as its agent, 
upon whom any papers affecting its liability on this bond may be served, and its liabili 
ty may be enforced on motion, without the necessity of an independent action. The motio 
and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the 
court who shall forthwith mail copies to the surety if his address is knoiro. 
Date this 2^ t h day of J^Y 19-ZL 
Annual Premium $. 60.00 
-in-Fac 
360012-8-67 
EXHIBIT "Of 
60 
MARK S. MINLR 
Attorney for Defendnats 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 363-1449 
faj^te nsi -
IN T!iE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
iiECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, 
D e f e n d a n t s , 
- v s -
GRLAT EQUITY LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY OF CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS STREATER CHEVRO-
LET COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
AL BARRUTIA, BRENT II. 
JENSEN, AND E. C. ROSE-
BOROUGH , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Civil No. C-79-4797 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That we, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, aa^ 
principals, and Emilio Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez. a&j* 
sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the above-napi** 
defendants in the full and just sum of Six Thousand Dol 
($6,000.00), together with interest and costs, to be paid 
said plaintiffs and third-party defendants, their succeffi 
m 
and assigns, to which payments well and truly to be I 
we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrate 
successors and assigns, jointly and severally by these pi 
sents. 
WHEREAS, lately in the Third Judicial Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, in an action oendinc in said CAU* 
EXHIBIT "P" 
between palmtiffs and defendants and third party defendants, 
a judgment was rendered against Hector Martinez and Manuel 
M. Rivera, on the day of , 1981, 
and the said defendants have taken an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah to reverse the said judgment in 
the aforesaid action; 
NOW, the condition of the above obligation is such 
that, if Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, shall satisfy 
the judgment in full, together with the costs and the interest, 
if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or the judgment is 
affirmed, and shall satisfy in full such modification of the 
judgment and such costs and interest as the Supreme Court 
may adjudge and award, then the above obligation shall be 
void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 
The above-mentioned sureties submit themselves 
to the jurisdiction of the Court and irrevocably appoint 
the Clerk of said Court' as their agent upon whom any papers 
affecting their liability may be served, and this liability 
may be enforced by motion and upon such notice as the Court 
may require without the necessity of an independent action. 
DATED this JT7~^ day of £^J&-&U.J , 1981. 
-2 
This Supersedeas Bond i s subsc r ibed and sworn 
to before me t h i s o2 / d a y of /&z/jh£e4 J , 1981. 
<AtM/[j^ PUBLfc F ' *Ww 
ng at Salt trake City, Utah 
Commission expires: /-^--i^-JV 
3^« 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-1449 
nteo m CVERK'S OFFICE 
SALT l A r r ^ ' - m Y . UTAH 
OCT 13 4 37 PH '83 
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.3RD D'SL COURT 
H. DIXO :.  ERK 
6Y6^^w iflfo#uig/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS; 
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED, AL BARRUTIA, 
BRENT H. JENSEN, and E.C. 
ROSENBOROUGH, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Civil No. C-79-4797 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That we, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, as 
principals, and Emilio Ramos Ortiz and Augustine Lopez, as 
sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the above-named 
defendants in the full and just sum of Seven Thousand Dollars 
($7,000.00), together with interest and costs, to be paid to 
said plaintiffs and third-party defendants, their successors 
EXHIBIT "Q" 
and assigns, to which payments well and truly to be made, 
we bind ourselves, our heris, executors, and administrators, 
successors and assigns, jointly and severally by these presents. 
WHEREAS, lately in the Third Judicial Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, in an action pending in said Court between 
plaintiffs and defendants and third-party defendants, a judgment 
was rendered against Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, on 
the ^n7day of X ^ j ^ ^ 1983, and the said defendants 
have taken an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
to reverse the said judgment in the aforesaid action; 
NOW, the condition of the above obligation is such 
that, if Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, shall satisfy 
the full judgment in full, together with the costs and the interest 
if for any reason the appeal isMismissed or the judgment is 
affirmed, and shall satisfy in full such modification of the 
judgment and such costs and interest as the Supreme Court may 
adjudge and award, then the above obligation shall be void, 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 
The above-mentioned sureties submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Court and irrevocably appoint the Clerk of 
said Court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their 
liability may be served, and this liability may be enforced by 
motion and upon such notice as the Court may require without the 
necessity of an independent action. 
DATED this P^? day of September, 1983. 
771 a^A oil-ft ^>co-<MK> 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, P r i n c i p a l 
AUGT&TINE L O P E Z / S u r e t y 
^SUBSKRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e 
)lPA{£~/./^i/ , 1983. me t h i s *? <**y or 
*"<*?*>•: 
A 
Coftimiss ion Exp i r e s : jlMfy 
I/JUC^ 
Rules of Practice 
The Utah Supreme Court would like to remind 
the practicing attorneys in Utah that Rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice for District 
and Circuit Courts needs to be strictly adhered 
to. Copies of proposed findings, judgments 
and/or orders must be served on opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court orders 
otherwise. The mailing certificate should 
be included on the findings, judgment and/or 
order submitted to the court. Notice of 
objections to the findings, judgment or order 
must be submitted to the trial court within 
five days of service upon opposing counsel. 
Rule 2.9 also requires that Judge retain 
the findings, judgment or order for the 5 
day period. Unless Rule 2.9 requirements 
aj*e met and the judgment or order is signed, 
there is no final judgment or order which 
can be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
EXHIBIT "R" 
